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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The issue of population policies has to be set against the background 
of the development process and viewed in terms of strategies for change and 
alternative notions of what society should be. Because of its implications, 
it is related in the immediate present to questions of short - and medium-term 
policyj moreover, it is impossible to formulate the model for future social 
structures without dealing with such issues as population quality, quantity 
and location. Population policies inherently touch upon issues that 
vitally affect the beliefs and value; commitments of social groups and 
classes, have an effect on the ideological framework in relation to which 
stability and change is gauged, and are associated with a redefinition of 
the system of human relations, in particular, the function of the family 
and the social role of women0 
2. It is this multiplicity of facets that makes the issue at once so 
specific and so diffuse, specific when it simplifies into a bare outline 
of variables, diffuse when exploring its great variety and complexity. The 
aspects it touches upon can be formalized to a high degree, and yet it is 
difficult to understand the significance of such abstractions unless it 
is remembered that each of them is linked directly not only to the rational 
orientations of human beings but also to their vital images, identifications 
and life goals. The success of such policies as Governments may adopt in 
this field have so far depended rather less on the political consensus 
achieved at any particular moment than on the possibility of persuading 
individuals and families, subject to the goals set by the particular society, 
to move and physically locate themselves in certain areas of the national 
territory and to plan the size of their families. In turn, the ability to 
make political consensus a reality at the grass roots level is dependent 
on many factors that over the short run generally escape Government control 
and in any case respond to the pace and direction of over-all progress. 
3. Latin America's population problems must be viewed against a background 
of economic and social semi-development. The broad diversity of national 
situations in the region may be described in terms of a typical pattern of 
evolution, in the sense that although the social structure and institutions 
/of the 
of the rural past have been or are about td be superseded and significant 
progress has been made in industrialization, it is nevertheless difficult 
to affirm that countries have as yet established themselves as modern 
industrial societies. 
Certain indicators can help to define the nature of this unusual 
state of affairs. There are significant differences between economic 
growth and the level of social progress, inter-related sectors corresponding 
to different stages of the modernization process tend to coexist, and there 
are indications of a high degree of cultural heterogenity, as well as sharp 
contrasts in the relative access of social groups and regions to the 
benefits of technological progress. (See table l). 
4. It is difficult to interpret the trend of these indicators, particularly 
since it has proved all but impossible to project the future direction that 
countries will take on the basis of recent patterns» The events of the 
past decade have rendered obsolete the economic and social models that 
have been the basis for action by Governments and their oppositions for 
more than 30 years. The basic dilemma arises when determining whether 
the present situation is just a transitional stage in the complex itinerary 
of industrial evolution, or whether there are indications that the 
possibilities for significant advances have gradually been exhausted, with 
progress now depending on a modification of the rules of the game at the 
national and international levels. 
In an atmosphere in which analytical work is concerned less and less 
with projecting social models and increasingly with identifying the 
assumptions and incongruencies of these models, giving rise to an almost 
introspective manner of reflecting on the direction and limits of recent 
development, the population issue comes to the fore as a result of the 
search for new strategies and avenues to dispel the ambiguities of this 
intermediate stage of serai-development. 
It is clear that the current concern with the issue constitutes an 
indirect admissal of the fact that the development of Latin America has 
been unbalanced and inadequate, and this in turn is prompted by new and 
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Europe 2 020 2 1*72 70.9 3.6 47 
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b/ Relates to Eastern Europe, including the USSR, 
0/ Relates to Esfit and South-East Asia, excluding Japan, 
d/ Relate? to East Asia, 
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5, This growing interest in the population issue springs from three 
complementary sources. First, the scientific and doctrinal interpretations 
of economic and social development which, in recognizing the importance of 
non-economic aspects, must identify the. main interrelationships that appear 
to exist between population trends and over-all progress in order to define 
the role of population as a factor in development. Secondly, the evolution 
of demographic behaviour in different social groups' reflects their effort 
at adapting their life styles to their concrete possibilities and 
circumstances within an over-all pattern of semi-industrialization. And 
thirdly, the action of Governments expressed through plans, policies and 
programmes, which respond to some extent to the need to compatibilize 
macro-strategies for development with the demand for services from 
family units. • 
Al. POPULATION 
II. POPULATION AND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF. DEVELOPMENT^/ 
1. Recent situation 
6. During the past decade, the concern of Latin American academic circles 
for population problems followed in the wake of ideological considerations. 
The most popular analyses of development showed an indirect interest in the 
problem and incorporated the volume, localization and growth rate of the 
population as a datum or factor in the formulation of given interpretations 
of development. Throughout the 1960's, social research institutes and 
centres tended to limit themselves to demography in the strictest sense, 
for the most part leaving the study of the relationship between population 
and development and of policy design to social doctrines whose main source 
of inspiration was the ideological controversy regarding the nature of the 
social order and the role of Latin American countries in the world system. 
The major arguments advanced by these doctrines related to the greater 
or lesser relevance of the population problem to development policies and, 
in the medium and long term, to the objectives of economic and social 
change. A closer look at the assumptions on which the arguments rest, 
reveals the existence of two trains of thought around which the various 
positions have been taken. With the realization that both the volume and 
growth rate of the population have sortie bearing on the transformation of 
the economic organization and social structure of countries, an effort was 
made to assess the impact of demographic factors and, above all, to determine 
at what point an unduly large population slows down the development process 
and under, what conditions it can be converted into a positive factor 
for change. -
The inverse relation between those two processes - that is, the effect 
that the economic and social development of Latin America might have in 
the near future on demographic trends - has also received considerable 
attention. 
1/ See L, Ratinoff, "Población y desarrollo en Araérica Latina; evolución 
~ de las doctrinas", Temas del BID, N°12, April 1971« • 
/In the 
In the first case, the arguments are based on certain diagnoses and 
interpretations of the nature of development; in the second, an attempt 
is made to form a clearer picture of the significance of the current 
demographic transition. , -
2. Diagnosis of the crisis and role of demographic growth 
7. The state of semi-development achieved by the region indicated that 
there had not been sufficient progress to resolve several problems inherited 
from the past nor, to resolve the new problems which were brought on by a 
greater degree of social differentiation. 
Under these circumstances, it was recognized that the dynamic domestic 
policy of countries aiming at a more autonomous form of development was 
at variance with their growing need for resources, technology and scientific 
knowledge from the countries at the centre and with their dependency on the 
wor3d market in raw materials. Rapid but limited growth appeared to have 
brought about a situation in which development potential was stifled by 
internal obstacles of a structural and institutional nature. The countries 
were faced with increasingly serious dilemmas in which they had to choose 
between social needs and aspirations and the requirements of general economic 
efficiency. Moreover, a critical lack of continuity was discernible 
between the capacity of institutions to mobilize groups and sectors, to 
bring about agreement among them and channel"their aspirations in a 
functional manner, and their ability to work towards the achievement of 
social targets, 
(a) ' The-theses 
8, As was to be expected, the diagnosis of the crisis took the form of 
theses regarding the possibility for the Establishment to explore new 
avenues and lay the foundations of a more efficient order. 
In recent decades, the ideologies that have determined social change 
in Latin America have placed more and more emphasis on the need to run 
the nation with the greatest possible autonomy and ensure an increasing -. 
participation of the large majority of the population by means of the 
expansion of the domestic market and the reform of ¡the administrative and 
political institutions. Naturally, the main differences have ben in the indudr 
/of the 
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of the reforms, the strategy or'critical path adopted and the alternative 
models of social organization. 
9, "*The conservative developmentist thesis is founded on the potential 
which the present Establishment offers,for rapid, development based on the 
consolidation of the domestic order, on the concentration of resources and 
their application to industrialization targets> on attracting foreign 
investment and on the more efficient exploitation of the markets of the 
economically advanced countries. 
Others have stressed the need for the gradual removal, in the medium 
and long term, of those obstacles of a structural nature that hinder 
development, that is to say, the creation, at a reasonable economic and 
social "cost", of the appropriate conditions, incentives and institutions 
for adjusting the social order to a system of development under which the 
raising of industrial productivity is compatible with the expansion of the 
domestic market. 
The revolutionary thesis predicates that the Establishment's potential 
has been exhausted and that the future of industrialization resides in the 
creation of a new system of political and social relationships involving 
a radical redefinition of the institutions of ownership and the structure 
of political power. 
10. The three theses differ among themselves both in their interpretation 
of the relevance of the political and social variables and in their 
selection of models or projects of society. In the eyes of the conservatives, 
the consolidation of the political order depends on the relatively extensive 
opportunities for economic growth which in the long term will make it 
possible to correct the immediate imbalances and sacrifices implicit in 
development. It accepts, moreover, the model of the capitalist consumer 
society which tends towards a two-fold expansion of the domestic market, 
stepping up the consumption of the highest income groups while gradually 
incorporating those sectors of society which, because of the very speed of 
e 
the process, stand on the threshold of incorporation. The images that are. 
used to explain the meaning of the transition and of the critical phases are 
drawn essentially from, the study of the processes of modernization that led 
to the creation of an industrial order in the more advanced countries. 
/The revolutionary 
The revolutionary viewpoint is that potential economic progress is 
imprisoned within the existing system of domination and that its liberation 
entails giving priority to the grealt task of political transformation and 
creation involved in the advance towards a socialist system. The model 
of the future social order is inspired by the revolutionary experience of 
the socialist countries and its application to local conditions means 
resorting to the instruments of analysis and to the guidelines afforded 
by the revolutionary ideologies. 
In the view of those who consider that, the Establishment is open 
to the introduction of successive reforms aimed at creating a more functional 
apd just social order, it is essential to strike a balance between economic 
growth with measures to redistribute benefits an transform the institutional 
framework. The fundamental logic of this strategy resides in the advantages 
offered by the step-by-step approach, assuming that the accumulation of 
succesive economic and social changes in a given direction eventually modifies 
the political system. It is difficult, to pinpoint the precise model Of 
society that is involved here, inasmuch as it involves the definition of 
non-revolutionary forms of life and controls while at the same time 
accepting the values of a liberal political, order. Implicit in this is 
the notion of some kind of mixed social structure which is to evolve 
pragmatically out of the experience of development, 
(b) Population and prospective change 
11. These forecasts regarding the possibilities of the Establishment 
in the present situation of semi-industrialization constitute the frame 
of reference for the Latin American debate on population, problems. 
Traditionally, the doctrine accepted in the region w§.s based on the 
idea that population growth was a favourable factor for development. The 
feeling was that population growth helped to increase and diversify demand, 
generated pressures for a better utilization of resources, and stimulated 
the creation of capacities which were essential in raising overall 
productivity. It was affirmed that the environment created by high 
population density facilitated the emergence of a modern industrial culture 
through progress towards social diversification and the division of 
/labour and 
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labour and by creating a scale which oriented and gave meaning to scientific 
and technological development. It was even accepted that the more rapid 
replacement of generations helped to accelerate the changes, since better 
trained young minds had in fact new conceptions which were more in line 
with progress in production and social modernization« 
It was also Relieved that only those countries which had attained 
an appreciable population could play a part in the world balance of power, 
and that for all practical purposes development opportunities should not 
be unrelated to the place which the nations occupied in the international 
system. The dilemmas posed by the state of underdevelopment prompted 
the different groups to revise this traditional conception, in the light 
of their economic and social objectives of change. 
(c) Population and conservative developmentism 
12. To the more representative sectors of conservative opinion the high 
rates of population growth pose a dilercna which is difficult to resolve, 
since it involves balancing traditional moral considerations against the 
goal of achieving rapid progress within the established social order. It 
is recognized that accelerated population growth can give rise to 
insuperable contradictions between the goals of economic development and 
social improvement. The extreme view is that population growth conflicts 
with economic development, since the capacity of social services and 
institutions and the resources which can be used for productive purposes 
run the risk of lagging behind the demand of a rapidly increasing population. 
This position does not, however, exhaust the alternative possibilities 
offered by conservative developmentism, Others accept the importance of 
the problem, but emphasize that the idea of the "overwhelming" nature of 
population growth rates is based on the assumption, within the medium term 
of a state of mass mobilization. They maintain that wherever conditions 
guarantee a period of mediatization of the participation and continuity 
of the Social order, excess population helps to keep wages down. Thus, in 
countries where the domestic market has reached a volume compatible with 
the level of modern technology, a curb on the rapid rise of industrial 




Furthermorep the population would have additional functions within a 
strategy of stepping up economic growth» With plentiful natural resources 
there would be a greater social capacity for land settlement and, in general, 
for opening up new frontiers within the country, incorporating new factors 
and possibilities into the economy. Moreover, with the assurance of 
economic growth during a transitional stage in a world that must increasingly 
adopt the scale of production imposed by modern technology, a subsequent 
phase of redistribution would offer a dynamic reserve of wide possibilities 
for consolidating whatever development had already been achieved. 
(d) Population vis-a-vis revolutionary ethics and practice 
13. Revolutionary developmentism focuses the problem of population 
growth in a dual perspective. At the level of private conduct, it favours 
responsible voluntary procreation, and ultimately the ethics of freedom 
and equality for women. It is accepted that in pre-revolutionary society, 1 
support should be given to efforts providing indispensable services 
and information to whoever may request them, but by no means -io accept 
pressures or incentives of the power élite to control the birth rate of 
the broad masses for political purposes. The central idea is that the 
decisions of couples with respect to the birth rate should reflect a 
cultural change induced by a larger share in the benefits of progress 3 
so that the full realization of these goals would be possible only in a 
revolutionary society. , 
At the level of general trends, excess population is considered 
to be a genuine instrument of change. Like their conservative counterparts, 
revolutionary ideologies point out that, given a minimum of political 
mobilization, rapid population growth accentuates pressures on institutions 
and resources, which, within the dynamics of a social confrontation betwe-an 
the masses and minorities, could help create the general, conditions 
conducive to revolution. In addition, increased population pressure is in 
itself an incentive to the adoption of new and more progressive criteria 
of rationality and social justice. These two perspectives are summed up 
ih the assertion that it is only in a revolutionary society, which develops 
in conformity with these criteria, that general population targets should 
/and can 
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and can coincide with the decisions of couples regarding the number of 
children they are to have. 
(e) Population growth and structural changes 
14. With regard to what might be called the structuralist approach to 
development, the central issue is defined by the historical singularity 
of the Latin American situation. Rapid though "insufficient" economic 
growth over the past three decades had disrupted the traditional balance 
between birth and death rates, in a context of technological modernization 
and increased consumer aspirations induced by the new levels of progress. 
It thus became necessary to place population problems within this 
development framework and to determine how far population trends and the 
dynamics and bottlenecks of progress affected one another, in order to 
frame realistic policies which considered the part which population growth 
played in development. 
These broad guiding .principles lead to some general conclusions 
which help to define the structuralists' position. The crux of the 
argument is that the importance of these problems and of a population policy 
in Latin America stems from the need to accelerate change, but under no 
circumstances would such a policy constitute an alternative to efforts 
aimed at realizing economic and social changes. Moreover, stric tly speaking, 
population policies are apparently inseparable from social policy, and to 
imagine options which acting independently could significantly alter 
population trends, is completely illusory. On the contrary, the rapid 
increase in excess population has short - and medium - term consequences 
which development policy should take into account. 
The structuralists affirm that, while they accept a development 
strategy aimed at harmonizing the need to maximize general economic 
efficiency with a steady rise in the levels of living of the broad masses, 
within the medium - and long - term population growth rates will have to 
be compatible with the fulfilment of those objectives. The combination 
of economic growth and social justice, on the basis ox sweeping 
technological change, presupposes that declining rates of population growth 
would rapidly be attained* 
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3- Inages cf the demographic transition 
15- These conceptions of the role of population in present 
development conjunctures are based on particular images of the demographic 
transition. The decision whether or not to intervene in such matters 
implies that there are priority areas in development plans that are 
affected by population trends and, furthermore, that these trends reflect 
the level and nature of development attained. If one accepts that, 
starting from a certain point in the region's recent history, the 
modification of a traditional state of equilibrium has given rise to a 
distinctive demographic evolution, then there is reason to wonder what 
the "natural" course of this transition is, that is to say, what direction 
the process will assume if unchecked by policies and programmes having 
a direct bearing on the birth rate. 
(a) Self-regulation 
16. A widespread interpretation emphasizes the fact that the acceleration of 
development necessarily leads to the self-regulation of demographic processes, 
since the birth rate would depend directly on variables such as school attendanc 
the incorporation of women in the labour fores and higher aspirations . 
associated with higher income levels. In stressing that the play of factors 
in the modernization process finally leads to a new balance between the 
birth rate and the mortality rate,, it is affirmed, on the one hand, that 
the demographic transition must necessarily follow the course taken by 
that process in the industrial countries, and it is suggested, on the other 
hand, that any attempt to alter the course determined by the forces 
and factors operating in the transition will bring negative consequences. 
(b) The critical phase of indetermination 
17» Those who accentuate the importance of internal disequilibria as 
characteristics of a situation of semi-development, argue that the "natural 
self-regulation cycle" is neither necessary nor irreversible, since there 
is a phase of "ind.etermination" which is the result of a lag in the 
decline of birth rates- Taking it for granted that modern medical 
practices bring about a historically different demographic situation, it 
may be concluded that the duration and the possibilities of modifying the 
/trends during 
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trends during the "indeteimination" phase are dependent upon the nature 
and degree of the disequilibria• Only an environment in which economic 
policy i3 based on social modernization measures makes for the creation 
of the social forces and institutional machinery which help to make 
birth control programmes successful, 
(c) The demographic trap 
18. Lastly, there is the position of those who believe that this transition 
leads towards a cumulative deterioration of certain relationships, and 
that to give the tendencies free rein necessarily leads to a "demographic 
trap" which could ultimately come to constitute an insurmountable 
obstacle to development. 
The "trap" is the result of the semi-modernized state of society 
and the lack of synchronization in the rhythm of economic and social 
changes. When the death rate drops and a traditional birth rate is 
maintained, an age structure is created which tends to intensify the 
rate of demographic growth with a sustained increase in the dependent 
population at the base. In such conditions, the impact of policies to 
improve the "quality" of the population and assimilate the "marginal" 
social sectors into productive employment is retarded by the demographic 
aggravant, thu3 favoring the conditions leading to a situation of 
strangulation. 
The demographic trap thus obliges the state to accept the responsibility 
of controlling demographic growth as part of general development policy. 
III. SOCIAL 
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III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH 
1. Demographic trends in the region 
19« The level of current information on past trends in the 
demographic variables which determined the growth and structure of 
Latin American population is such that only a superficial analysis 
can be made of the circunstances and the manner in which' the process 
of demographic change has been occurring in the region. The following 
paragraphs outline a few aspects of demographic growth in the countries 
of the region during the present century and draw inferences 
regarding probable future trends within the limitations imposed by 
the availability and quality of the information, in particular that 
relating to components of demographic change. 
Although the growth of population varied greatly from country to' 
country a high degree of similarity in the trends can be observed. 
In most countries, the figures show a steady acceleration in the rate 
of population increase up to I960 (see table 2). The few countries 
that depart from the general trend are those in which fertility 
fell appreciably (Chile) or in which international migration played 
an important role during a particularly period (Venezuela) or 
in which both phenomena occured (Argentina, Uruguay and Cuba). 
These trends are reflected in a growing acceleration of the 
rate of increase of the region's total population* The growth rate 
came close to its maximum height at the beginning of the 1960s, when 
the rising trend lost impetus as a result of the slackening of growth 
in some countries, chiefly Brazil, which together with the continued 
decline in the rate of increase in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and 
Cuba, offset the acceleration in the growth rate that is still occurring 
in many countries. 
20. Except in the cases of Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba and Venezuela, where 
international migration has been an important factor in growth during 
given periods, the population of Latin American countries has grown 
virtually exclusively as a result of natural growth processes. 
/Table 2 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICAS RATES OP POPULATION INCREASE, BY COUNTRIES, 1920-1970 
Country 1920-1925 1925-1930 1930-J-935 1935-3940 1940-1945 1945-1950 1950-1555 1955-1960 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 5 1965-570 
Argentina 3.17 2 . 8 1 1 , 8 6 1 , 6 7 1.67 2 , 1 1 2 , 0 5 1 . 9 8 1.58 1 . 5 6 
Bolivia 1 . 0 6 1,26 1,45 1 . 6 2 1.78 1„92 1 . 9 7 2 , 1 6 2 . 2 9 2.41 
Brazil 2 . 0 5 2 . 0 5 2 . 0 5 2.11 2 . 2 7 2,55 2 . 9 7 3 , 0 3 2 . 8 6 2.87 
Colombia 1.94 I . 9 6 2 . 0 3 2,19 2^36 2 . 6 5 3.05 3 . 2 7 3.32 3.46 
Coata Rioa 1,61 1.82 2 , 0 0 2.35 2 . 9 8 3.44 3.74 4 . 1 3 3.6 5 3.05 
Cuba 2,66 2 . 6 7 1.93 1,58 1.55 .2,28 2 . 1 3 2,14 2 . 0 7 2.00 
Chile 1,54 1.61 1.55 1.50 1,54 1.74 2.41 2 „40 2 , 5 0 2.26 
Ecuador 1.14 1,46 1.71 1.91 2 . 0 6 2,41 2 . 8 3 3 . n 3.35 3.41 
El Salvador 2 . 1 8 2 . 0 9 1,19 1.30 1,23 2 . 0 5 2.51 2 . 9 0 3.04 3*36 
Guatemala 1,11 2,91+ 2,42 1.97 3.36 3 . 1 0 2 . 6 7 2 . 8 2 2.93 2 , 8 9 
Haiti 1 . 2 5 1.39 1.51 1 . 6 0 1,78 1.84 1.95 2 . 1 5 2,28 2.45 
Honduras 1<94 1 . 9 2 1.61 1=73 2 . 0 1 2.36 2 . 6 2 3 . 1 8 3.37 3.43 
Ifexico 0.95 1.76 1.75 1.84 2,88 3.12 2.94 3*20 3.45 3.50 
Nioaragua 1.46 1«55 1.74 2 , 0 0 2 . 2 7 2.55 2 , 6 6 3.04 3.06 2 . 9 8 
Panam 1 . 5 8 1.59 0 , 8 6 2.57 2.55 2.53 2,39 2.97 3.23 3.27 
Paraguay 2.35 2 , 3 1 2.34 2.37 1 . 8 2 2 , 0 1 2 , 6 0 2 . 7 8 3.24 3.46 
Peru 1,4? 1,56 1 . 6 5 1.72 1.75 1.81 1.98 2 , 6 6 3.05 3.12 
Dominican Republic 1.99 2.16 2 . 2 8 2,34 2.63 2,84 3.02 3»20 "3.25 3.44 
Uruguay 2 . 0 6 2.04 1.50 1.18 1.13 1.30 1,48 1,44 1.35 1 , 2 3 
Venezuela 1.93 2 . 1 7 2 , 2 7 2.37 2084 3.11 3°99 3«92 3 «31 3.37 
Subtotal (20 countries) 1,86 ZsSl 1 . 8 9 • 1*91 2«22 2=22 h2l 
> dr 
tT CO 
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Source; Martina and Pelaez* op.clt. 
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At the beginning of the present century, gross mortality rates 
in most of the countries of the region probably ranged between 30 and 
35 per thousand, and since then have gradually declined, at different 
rates in different countries and periods, to presently lower levels. 
It is estimated that in 1970, 13 of the 20 countries listed in 
table 3 had a gross mortality rate of less than 10 per thousand, and 
that only two countries had rates higher than 15 per thousand. 
There are clear indications that the decline was not' uniform over time 
but rather that it was relatively slow up to about 1930 and slightly 
faster between then and the Second World War, after which it accelerated 
appreciably. 
21. It is estimated that at the beginning of the century, birth rates in 
all countries of the region were above 40 per thousand, and in 
many cases over 45 per thousand. Until recently, all analyses of 
fertility trends in Latin America have ended up with the generalization 
that, except for a few countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Cuba, 
which are at different but relatively advanced stages of the process 
of demographic change) "birth rates have remained high - between 
40 and 50 per thousand - and there are no symptoms of significant change 
such as might suggest that a period of decreasing fertility is beginning".^ 
It has generally been affirmed that the fluctuations observable in the 
birth rates of these countries do not reflect real changes in the 
reproductive behaviour of the population but rather stem from a variety 
of other factors such as improvement of records, better health conditions, 
changes in the level of mortality, increased stability of marriages and 
changes in the nuptiality rate. In all these analyses, the notion that 
fertility is closely associated with economic, social, psychological 
and cultural variables that change slowly in tune with the modernization 
process has probably been overemphasized. It is true true that the 
effect of the factors mentioned above may explain some part or even 
1/ ECLA, Social change and social development policŷ  in Latin America 




LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATES OP NATURAL liCOEASE, BIRTHS AND DEATHS BY COUNTRIES, I96O-I97C 
Country Population 1970 
(in 000's) 
Average annual 
rate of natural 
Increase 
(per 1 000) 
Crude birth rate 
(per 1 000) 
Crude death rate 
(per 1 000) 
i960 1970 i 9 6 0 1970 i 9 6 0 1 9 7 0 
Argentina 24 352 1.66 1.52 23.3 2 2 . 9 7»7 
Bolivia 4 658 2 . 3 0 2.46 44,0 43.8 2 1 , 0 19.2 
Brazil 93 245 3.03 2,08 39« 8 37.3 9.5 8.5 
Colombia 22 I 6 0 3.29 3.51 45.0 44ç..o 12,1 8.9 
Chile 9 717 2C45 1,96 38.3 27.4 13.8 7.8 
Ecuador 6 028 3.23 3.41 46,0 45.0 I3.7 10.9 
Paraguay 2 413 2.95 3=53 45.C.0 45„o 15.5 9.7 
Peru 13 586 2.85 3,14 43,0 4l,0 14,5 9.6 
Uruguay 2 88? 1.39 1.21 22<_0 2 1 , 1 8d 9.0 
Venezuela 10 755 3.59 3,26 43.4 40.6 7.5 8 , 0 
Costa Rica 1 736 3.89 2,92 48,0 34.5 9.1 5.3 
El Salvador 3 44l 2 . 8 1 3.44 47,6 46,7 ?.9a5 12.3 
Guatemala 5 282 2 , 8 8 2 , 8 8 47.6 42o5 l8s8 13.7 
Honduras 2 5O3 3.12 3.30 46.7 48.3 15.5 15»3 
Nicaragua 2 021 3.05 3.12 47,0 46,4 1 6 , 5 15.2 
Panama 1 4o6 3.10 3.26 42,1 39.8 1 1 . 1 7.2 
Mexioo 50 7 1 8 3.32 3.50 45.0 44c0 1 1 . 8 9 . 0 
Cuba 8 341 2,42 2,00 31.5 28,0 7e3 8.0 
Haiti 5 299 2.20 2.54 44,0 44o0 £ 2 . 0 l M 
Dominican Republic 4 348 3.22 3.51 49 „1 48.3 1 6 . 9 
Total (20 oountrles) 221.214 2,90 2*21 4o,l 25fc? 11.1 2*1 
Source» Martine and Pelaei;, op.cjta 
/perhaps a 
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perhaps a significant part of the fluctuations, but it is also 
increasingly evident, that the population of Latin American countries 
includes socio-economic groups with different levels of fertility, 
and that these differences, viewed in the context of the process of 
social change taking place in the countries, must have some influence 
on the variations observable in the birth rates. This would appear to 
indicate that the phenomenon of fertility is probably much more dynamic 
than analyses of birth rates would suggest. 
V 
22. Recent studies would seem to bear out thi3 assertion.-* The cases of 
Brazil and Costa Rica are worthy of note here, the first because of its 
weight in the growth of fertility in the region, the second because 
of the(rapidity with which change is occuring, a decline unprecedented in 
Latin America and one of the most rapid on record in the history 
of the Western world. 
On the basis of available census data on the number of live births 
per woman in Brazil it is possible to estimate the evolution of the birth 
and gross reproduction rates during the last three decades.^ According 
to these estimates, Brazil's birth rate declined from about 46 per 
1,000 in 1940 to less than 40 per 1,000 in I960 and to a little over 
37 per 1,000 in 3-970. At the same time, the gros3 reproduction rate 
fell from 2.8 in the period 1940-1950 to 2.6 in 1960-3.970. A more 
detailed analysis by physiographic regions, social groups, and migration 
status among the residents of urban areas confirms the slow gradual 3/ 
decline of these rates. 
The sharp decline in fertility in Costa Rica is clearly shown in 
various studies.^ During the 1950's, the gross birth rate reached 
1/ George Martine and César Peliez, "Population trends in the I9601s: 
Some implications for development" (ECLA, in press). 
2j Carmen Arretx, "Revision de las estimaciones de fecundidad de Brasil 
a fease de los censos de Í940. 1950. I960 y 1970". CELÂDE, S/66/25. 
2/ George Martine and César Peláez, op.ir cit. 
ij See documents presented at the Fifth National Demographic Seminar, 
Costa Rica, September 1970, particularly Miguel Gómez B., 
"El rápido descenso de la fecundidad en Costa Rica", pages 271-308. 
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to one of the highest known levels, and in I960 it still stood at 
48 per 1,000. Subsequently it started to decline, gradually during 
the first half of the decade and more rapidly in the second half, 
so that by 1970, it had dropped to 35 per 1,000, that is, a reduction 
of 30 per cent in 10 years. 
2« Hypotheses on demographic change 
23« In short, population trends in Latin American countries may 
be said to have varied widely, having now reached very different stages 
of the demographic transition. In most countries, however, the trend 
has been towards an acceleration of population growth as a result of 
the increasing imbalance between the birth and mortality rates. What 
is likely to be the future course of population growth in such countries? 
To answer this question properly, it would be necessary to make a 
careful and far-reaching analysis of the situation and trends in 
components of demographic change and related economic and social 
factors in each individual country such an endeavor goes fsr beyond 
the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, some general observations 
may be made here regarding population growth prospects in these countries.^ 
First of all, given that the probable range of variation of 
mortality in the future will be relatively limited, a.c.d thjt international 
migration, although unpredictable, will probably exert very little 
influence in most countries, it can be concluded that fertility .will be the 
key variable in future grovrbh process; its evolution will largely 
determine the rate of population increase. 
Secondly, recent research into the existence of differential, 
fertility r.stes, and into birth control attitudes and practice in the 
populations of many countries, together with the growth in the coverage 
of family planning programmes and the interest of Governments in them, 
lead to the conclusion that the process of change in the reproductive 
behaviour of the population is much more than dynamic than would be 




suggested by analyses of recent trends in an over-all indicator 
such as the crude birth rate. 
Thirdly, it is becoming increasingly evident that the progress 
which has been registered in the technology of birth control techniques, 
together with the increase in the scope and effectiveness of the mass 
communications media, have weakened the causal relationship between 
socio-economic change and fertility decline. These developments would 
1/ 
thus come to reinforce prediction made by the United Nations,^ on the 
basis of an analysis of the relationship between fertility patterns 
and socio-economic indicators, that several countries with currently 
high rates of population growth would now be on the verge of 
experiencing a drop in their birth rates. The decreases, observed in 
several countries during the past decade would appear to bear out this 
predicted trend. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that, given recent developments in 
birth control technology and mas3 communications media, declines in 
birth rates could possibly become accelerated in much the same way 
as mortality has been lowered in developing regions. That is, the 
demographic transition which took more than a century to unfold in 
the technologically-advanced nations could be telescope-! into a few 
decades in many Latin American countries. 
3* Urbanization and fertiliy 
25« It is in the urban environment, particularly in the large cities, 
that the principal changes in reproductive behaviour occur, The situations 
that ttiis social structure determines, the motivations it induces and 
the expectations it creates, constitute the dynamic factor par excellence 
in the process of modernizing demographic behaviour. 
Although the Latin American city is at once the stage and the 
focal point of this transformation, in many countries the very nature 
of urban development, while creating the conditions essential for change, 
also maintains other conditions that constitute veritable barriers to 
the spread of change. 
1/ Population Bulletin of the United Nations. N° 7 (United Nations 
publications, Sales N° 64.XIII.2T 
/A brief 
A brief examination of the cities of the region viewed as systems 
for living suggests the existence of social structures that perhaps 
represent moments in a typical pattern of development, with each 
moment having its corresponding and clearly defined fertility 
patterns. 
To illustrate the trend of these changes it may be useful to look 
at four types of urban sôtablishment. Historical urban social structures 
can be classified according to the nature of the predominant elite 
into aristocracies and oligarchies. Contemporary structures, can be 
defined in terms of the impact of industrialization into two types of 
establishment, in one of which the domination of the middle classes becomes 
stronger, and the other in which progress in industrialization generates 
a situation of semi-development where expectations rise far above 
concrete possibilities. 
Available data.would indicate that there ha3 been a steady evolution 
in the sense of replacing birth-promoting attitudes based on an ideology 
awi a religious ethic with secular criteria induced by social mobility 
and consumption, and that these new values have in part emerged out 
of the transformations of the elite and the consolidation of a 
middle-class cult tire. 
(£) The structures of the past 
26. Here, it may be worthwhile to refer to cities a-: they were typically 
in the past - generally relatively small agglomérations that were 
organized to provide services for a fairly small elite during 
pre-industrial stages of Latin American development. 
;.'-'he aristocratic city 
The aristocratic urban establishment was structured around a 
group of families whose livelihood was based on the ownership and 
exploitation of land. The relative absence of economic differentiation 
reflected a social structure in which the élite not only occupied the 
central and predominant place., but also to a large extent constituted 
the direct source of most employment opportunities and income for the 
other sectors of the city. Criteria of stratification were 
/predominant and 
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predominant and the small middle classes occupied a subordinate service 
position. The masses, while more numerous, were stratified in 
accordance with the location of their activities vis-̂ a-vis the 
aristocracy. 
In this atmosphere of limited opportunities, and hence of little 
mobility, where competitive values had little significance as 
compared with stratification criteria, the reproduction of the elite 
and the middle classes was ideologically regulated by transcendental 
norms that favoured abundant fertility and this also permeated the 
behaviour of the masses. 
(ii) The oligarchic city 
27' The oligarchic urban establishment reflects a stage of greater 
differentiation- Exports of raw materials to international markets 
herein favour the consolidation of a social structure based on an 
alliance of the interests of landowners and exporters. The size of the 
city swells and the quantity of the economic surplus multiplies. 
Exporting requires more specialized services, and hero? through 
these changes new opportunities are created that foster the formation 
of a more extensive and complex middle class, and of lower strata that 
are larger and yet less diverse. However, within the lower strata, 
artesan-type skills maintain their traditional impc.rcar.ee end lead 
to the emergence of a sub-elite which gradually organizes itsef, often 
under the guise of forming a workers' culture-
The middle classes monopolize opportunities for social mobility, 
and the elite ceases to be a hard core of inter-related families 
now trjt it has been joined by interests associated with the export . 
trade. After this breakthrough,there i3 a change in the ideologies 
justifing the social order. Many of the transcendental notions that 
formerly governed behaviour become secularized, and the importance of 
acquisitive values grows. 
The new levels of competition, however, do not seriously affect the 
positions held by the elite, which tends to retain its traditional 
reproductive behaviour- As the middle classes increase in size, they 
/strengthen their 
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strengthen their commitment to secular values, and here the first 
signs of a reproductive behaviour oriented towards mobility and the 
acquisition of status can be observed in a slow gradual decline of 
average family size. The lower strata maintain their traditional 
level of fertility, 
(b) Present-day structures . 
28. Industrialization brings with it a complete upheaval of the 
patterns of urban life, a major transformation in the structure of 
employment and an unprecedented opening up of new opportunities. 
Cities expand rapidly until, in some cases, they attain the proportion 
of metropolises and even megalopolises. The growth rate of the 
economic surplus not only exceeds past trends but swiftly reaches high 
levels. Along with schools, the expansion of the urban market plays 
a key role in the socialization of the population, both institutions 
creating new expectations and consumer patterns. 
The elite changes its character. A new social pact leads to 
the gradual admission of industrialists, administrators and technocrats. 
The norms that determine power structures have to be adjusted to the 
requirements of a larger, more fluid and complex elite» Nob only do 
ideologies become increasingly secularized; they begin to be permeated 
by concepts that emphasize functionality targets at the expense of 
values of hierarchical ranking. 
This expansion opens up new avenues of social mobility and preference 
is given to ideologies that justify the social displacement.of families 
and Individuals. Some sectors of the middle classes are absorbed into 
the elite and the rules governing entry into it are partly relaxed. 
Craftsmanship loses all meaning in city life and the organized 
industrial workers become the sector through which the social demands 
of the masses are voiced. The system of qualifications is modified 
and, along with it, the notion of a natural working-class hierarchy 
based on skills. It is the access to the urban market by means of-
industrial employment and the possibility of influencing the power • 
structure through organization that determine the degree of integration 
/in the 
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in the culture of the city. Accordingly, new paths slowly begin 
to open up for the social mobility of individuals making their 
way up from the lower classes. 
29' The balance between the expectations and the possibilities of 
mobility is generally critical- Inadequate development is a 
factor that tends to create expectations that go beyond the 
available opportunities. 
Within this general pattern two stages can be distinguished. 
The first begins with the crisis of the system of oligarchical 
domination as, between the fissures of the crumbling order, a 
Establishment evolves in which the middle classes gradually come to 
play a central role. In the second stage, the main phenomenon 
is industrialization, whose effects are felt at every level of the 
social structure but which has a limited capacity for creating a 
system of life based on technology and on production of the 
industrial type. 
(i} The mesocratic urban Establishment 
30. In its early stages, industrialisation encouraged the formation 
of an urban Establishment possessing three fundamental characteristics: 
1« A,quantitative increase in the masses which come to 
represent a large proportion of the population of ibe city but of 
which only a very small nucleus is politically crg?..oized• 
2« An expansion of the middle classes which increase their . 
political and social influence to a significant degree and which 
include various entrepreneurial segments of the population« 
3- An intensification of the process of secularization based 
on the development of the urban market and on a middle class 
committed to the values of an acquisitive and socially mobile society. 
In this context, the rise of the middle classes is bound up -
with ideologies that question the legitimacy of the existing order 
and offer alternatives that emphasize the recognition of personal 
merit. The basic idea is to create a stable hierarchy that permits 
the free acquisition of a position in society on the basis of 
individual ability. 
/ A s t h e 
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As the middle class comes to constitute the principal support 
of the social order and its standard of living rises, so there is an 
intensification in competition for the means and symbols that are 
indispensable for acquiring and maintaining social status. 
The fate of the masses is determined by their access to stable and 
productive employment and to culture and by their ability to organize 
themselves. The objective of the struggle of vast masses is in any 
case to gain a foothold in the market by means of organizations that 
emphasize solidarity, and thus considerations of acquisition and social 
mobility falter down to them only in a slow and selective manner-
Fertility follows this general pattern extremely closely. The social 
groups most intensely committed to the acquisition of status tend to 
employ birth control, a tendency which rapidly becomes one of the distinctive 
features of the nascent culture of the middle class. It will likewise be 
found that the frequency of induced abortions is greater among these groups. 
The traditional elite groups see reproduction in terms of transcendental 
considerations,while among the lower classes,children continue to be 
an inevitable phenomenon. 
(ii) The semi-industrial city 
31* The semi-industrial city is characterized by the initiation of a 
far-reaching transformation of urban culture and, by the imbalance between 
social expectations and the inability of the system to fulfil them as 
well as an imbalance between the requirements and the possibility of resolving 
the problems posed by the human agglomeration. 
The middle classes presently constitute a large proportion of the 
population; there exists a more complex elite in which primary relationships 
lose their relative importance and a social stratification of the masses 
is taking place as a result of the appearance1 of marginality. 
Social capilarity increases but the secularization and universalization 
of customs come up against limits that are implicit in prestige systems 
and in the distribution of opportunities for mobility. The fruits of 
urban progress are distributed on a selective basis so that only the 
upper segments of the popular sectors acquire access to the market and to 
social mobility. This insufficient and selective diversification gives 
/greater stability 
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greater stability to prestige systems and to principles that were 
traditionally associated with the rank of the families. 
Below the level of the specialized industrial workers, the various 
nuclei that are in situations of marginality organize themselves in terms 
of their most fundamental problems of incorporation so as to assure 
a foothold in the market. 
32- Reproductive behaviour conforms to the following set of situations: 
1. - The new complexity of the elite and the replacement of the 
system of primary relationships by a system of representation and 
administration of interests leads to a lower birth rate in accordance 
with heightened inter-personal competition. 
2. In the middle classes, the birth rate continues to go down 
as consumption levels go up and competition for opportunities of social 
mobility increases. 
3- A similar phenomenon occurs among industrial workers belonging to 
trade unions as they develop aspirations towards mobility and become 
consrmption-minded. 
4- In marginal sectors,political mobilization and basic organization 
are factors that tend towards a rationalization of reproductive behaviour, 
as opposed to what happens among sectors that still constitute an 
amorphous mass. 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the process of urbanization and 
cultural secularization on the one hand and the intensification of 
aspirations towards consumption and mobility on the other, an increase in 
the frequency of induced abortions is discernible, especially among the 
masses. 
4" Social structure of the city and impact of selected variables 
33« Recent research would indicate that the behaviour of certain key 
variables which influence the reproductive conduct .of the population would 
seem to modify their effects according to types of urban social structures. 
Unfortunately, the results are barely indicative of the existence of 
relationships, and the data at most permit us to formulate educated guesses 
regarding their significance. 
/(a) Educational 
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(a) • Educational level of mother 
34- The date show that the educational level influences reproductive 
behaviour in Latin America as elsewhere. Studies indicate an inverse 
ratio between number of children and women's education. Nevertheless, 
although the relationship is monotpnic in all the cases studied, there 
are important variations as regards birth rate and educational levels-
In some urban centres,the differences in birth rate attributable to 
education would seem to be smaller; in other cities the critical point 
at which the educational level has the effect of reducing the birth 
rate is higher, and different critical levels may even exist. It is clear 
that although education has a univocal effect on the birth rate, its 
role varies according to the specific social context-^ 
Several hypotheses will serve to illustrate the trend of these variations. 
It would in fact appear that in the social environments having a more 
widespread experience of mobility and market participation, and a higher 
degree of cultural secularization, sizable increases in educational level 
lead to small differences in birth rates, the critical thresho?_d being 
reached only with respect to those who in practice have no education, 
2/ in other words, those who are excluded from the market and from mobility. 
1/ Ana María Rothraan, "La fecundidad en Buenos Aire.-i q-gún algunas 
características demográficas y socioeconómicas", CELALE, Series C, 
N° 99, 1967; Carmen Miró and Walter Mertens, "Influencia de algunas 
variables intermedias en el nivel y en los diferenciales de fecundidad 
urbana y rural en América Latina", CELADE, Series A, N° 92, 1969; 
Virginia Rodríguez, "Fecundidad diferencial según nivel de instrucción". 
CELATE, Series C, N° 97, 1971; Alfredo Enrique Lattes, "La fecundidad 
efectiva en República Argentina según algunas características de la madre" 
CELADE, Series C, 1967; M- EÍsa Cerisola, "Fecundidad 
diferencial en la República del Paraguay según condición de ruralidad 
y nivel de instrucción de la mujer", CELADE, Series C. N° 101, 1967-




AVERAGE NUM3ER OF LOTS BIRTHS BY EDUCATIONAL I M . OF W W IHTHWIEWBD 
Educational level Bogota Buenos Aires 




Janeiro San JosS 
All woman M2 
No education 4.12 2.50 4.27 4.53 4.00 3.33 3.8? 
1 to 3 years of pricaiy 
education 1.55 3.82 4.16 4.18 2.33 3.73 
4 years or more of 
primary education 3.17 1.50 2.97 3.83 3.73 2.46 3.74 
Primary education 
ooiopleted 3.23 1.7^ 2.61 3.14 3.14 2.17 2.83 
1 to 3 years of seoondaiy 
education 2.8? 1.46 1.88 2.20 2.67 . 1.63 2,26 
if years or more of 
secondary education 2.52 1.35 2.16 1.85 2.14 1.43 1.91 
Seoondary education 
oonpleted 2.52 l.o7 1.71 1.83 1.65 1.38 2.00 
Iiess than 5 years of 
university education 0.68 1.12 0.68 1.41 l.oj 1.05 1.5? 
5 years or more of 
university education •1.83 1 . 0 3 1.31 1.8J 1.22 1.21 1.18 
Not stated 2.00 1.23 6» 00 - 3.00 2 . 0 0 
Sources Carmen A-, Un program de enouestas de fecundidad en America le-tin? .s i fjf-.rtsoi.in de alguno3 
connepto.? errtfneos (CEiADE, Series A, H° 4?, Santiago, Chile, 1?70) of. Pa 15« 
/In urban 
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In urban social environments having low levels of market participation 
and wherein mobility experiences are more restricted and occur within 
a less secularized culture, education has a different role. As a 
general rule, birth rates are higher and hence rates similar to 
those in the first type of.environment described require a lengthier 
period of formal education. Furthermore; there are significant differences 
in the number of children as a result of the education received- A 
rapid examination of education thresholds appears to show a direct 
relationship between a greater degree of mobility and participation in 
the market and the critical level of education at which the birth 
rates begins to fall.^ 
It should also be added here that in the environments in which the 
standards of a transcendental culture prevail, the more educated the 
mother the more likely she seems to .adopt, secular notions regarding 
reproductive behaviour. 
(b) Participation of women in urban economic activity 
35« Studies show that the birth rate is lower for working women.^ 
Although this is the conclusion reached in most research, the data do 
not make it possible to c3.ariiy the significance of the relationship. 
The central assumption is that there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between work outside the household and bringing up children. 
This would seem to be borne out by studies showing that the 
difference between the ideal number of children aspired to and the 
actual number is significantly higher with working women, owing to a 
3/ 
greater propensity to remain single or to marry at later ages.*" 
1/ Alfredo Lattes, op. cit.. 
2/ Ana Haría Rothman, La participación femenina en actividades económicas 
en su relación con el nivel de fecundidad en Buenos Aires y México 
(CELADE, Series C, N° 108, 1969); Paula Hollerbach Hass, Maternal 
Employment and Fertility in Metropolitan Latin America (Duke University, 
1971); Henry Kirsch, "Development strategy implications of 
population growth and labour force absorption in Latin America" 




ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE ÏEMAIS POPULATION, BY CITY AND COUNTRY 
(Pwoartagea) 
Ci-fcr Economically 
active Country a/ 
Eoo no-irLoally 
aotive 
Bogotá 39,1 C clon» la 20.3 
Buenos Aires 38.2 Argentina 23.2 
Caracas 26.8 Venezuela 20,2 
Mexico 26.8 Maslco 19.7 
Panamá 38.1 Panama 24.7 
San Josa' 39,5 Costa Rioa I7a5 
Río de Janeiro 30.7 Brésil 18.4 
Souroe: CXIAE& (PSCFAL-ö), tabulation Group II, variables 25 x 121 and JirSaï-national' 
Labour Office, Ye^^ok^of^^ioig^^StatirtioSj ljSj, Baasd on data from table 2 A, 
&/ Î5 ana over, According to the i960 censúaes, ... 
/Table 10a 
Tabla 6 
EJONOl-ffiSALLY ACTIVE ASMALE POPUUTION BY EDUCATIONA.L LEVEL 
Peroentage economically activa by 
eduoational level 
B. Distribución of eoonocd.cally active í'emale 




















Seoondary üntversiíy Total 
Bogotá 40,6 37.2 38.2 69,0 38.8 30.3 28.3 2.6 100.0 
Buenos Aires 3?»6 31.6 46.4 65.9 6b9 5 2 . 4 29.3 11,4 100,0 
Caraoas 23,4 2 9.7 35.3 57,5 32.3 38.5 22.8 v 6.4 100,0 
México 37.? 27.5 37.1 5 0 . 0 36.3 29.3 26,1 8.3 100.0 
Panamá 3 2 . 0 3 2 . 0 39.0 63.3 7.5 31.7 45.0 15.8 100.0 H 
San Josá 34,1 36.2 42.5 70.5 22.6 37.9 27.8 W.7 100.0 1 
Rio de Janeiro 35.3 24.5 31.8 49.3 34.8 28.6 32.0 4.6 1 0 0 c o 
Souree: CELAOS (PECF¿L~U), Tabulation Group II, variables 20 x 25o 






DISTRIBUTION OP ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE ESM&IS POPULATION BY OCCUPATION 
(PerceEtegea) 




City San Jose 
Rio de 
.Janeiro 
Professional \ 9 0.7 2.3 3.0 1.3 1.1 1.7 
Ifejjagers 4.0 1,5 2«1 5.5 7.3 3o3 l4c2 
High-lenrsl supervisors 5.0 19.4 15.5 n c 7 2 6 . 5 22.6 11.2 
)Vrw»level supervisors 17.9 28.4 14.0 2 5 , 6 6.3 13.5 8 . 1 
Skilled manual workers 36'. 0 33.8 24,8 2 7 . 0 27.1 44,0 12.9 
Unsldlled manual workers 36,2 1 6 . 2 •41.3 2 7 . 2 31.5 15.0 51.9 
Total 100*0 100.J) ].0Q,0 100*0 »-perrtS»«« IOO4O • £22&2 m a 




PERCENTAGE OP FSIALE POPULATION NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE, AND 
ECONOMICALLY A CI ETS WORKING IN AND OUTSIDE THE HOUSSHOJJD 
Not e conoid, cally 
aotl'.'e 











































Source; CELADE (PECPÀL-U), Tabulation Group II, va.?iai>le3 25 x 12. 
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There are indications that work outside the home does not 
of itself determine a lower birth rate, as compared to the influence 
exerted by the motivations to take an outside job. It may be observed 
that in "white-collar" jobs, which represent a more definite trend 
towards mobility and consumption, the incompatibility between job and 
home is intensified. 
It would also seem that urban culture conditions the degree of 
compatibility between women's roles in society. In cities where market 
experience and mobility affect small groups of the population, and where 
the secularization of culture is in its early stages, a high fertility rate 
is to be osbserved, along with low knowledge of contraceptive methods, 
low education, lack of stimuli to undertake work outside the home, and 
hence, a clear incompatibility between job and home. 
Existing data show that in cities where consumer society organization 
predominates, women constitute a larger share in the labour force, and 
a greater proportion of the female labour force is employed in productive 
employment requiring some degree of qualification; thus women generally 
have attained educational levels comparable with those of men. 
36« It should also be added that there appears to be a clear link between 
the type of urban social structure and levels of qualification and 
participation of women in the labour force by age. There are indications 
that in the least developed urban social systems the majority of working 
women have low levels of schooling; this means that with more education, 
women's share in employment drops, with the sole exception of the group 
which reaches university level. In cities, however, where social 
mobility is intensified and purchase criteria predominate, the converse 
ratio should occur, re suiting in an increasingly smaller proportion 
of unqualified women. 
A similar situation exists with regards to age participation. Data 
indicate that in the most traditional urban systems, there are few 
differences in female participation by age, and there is perhaps a 
slight tendency for participation to increase between 40 and 50 years of 
age; however, where the population is characterized by a higher degree of 
/market experiences 
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market experiences and mobility, the tendencies appear to be different. 
The increase in female participation would be such as to gradually 
become a decreasing function, illustrating a new adjustment between 
consumption aspirations, mobility and family life. 
To sum up the foregoing, it is obvious that the development of 
the aforementioned tendencies reflects the emergence of a new style 
of life dominated by a consumer culture wherein the market and social 
mobility finally redefine woman's role in society. The increase in 
female participation in economic activity is linked with schooling, 
with a slow but steady withdrawal from traditional low productivity 
employments, and with a postponement first of the age at marriage and 
subsequently of child-bearing» The net result is a drop in the i/ birth rate.^ 
(c) Social stratification» mobjJ-î iand̂ reprqdnctlve behaviour 
37- Up till now, the little research which has been carried out on the 
relation between the birth rate and social stratification has 
unfortunately uti.Li.zed partial indicators and aggregate categories-
As a general rule, employment status has been used as an indicator 
to demonstrate the theory that the higher the occupational rank of the 
° / 
husband, the fewer children families tend to have ̂  As in the ca3e 
of the above-mentioned variables, this ratio appears to be a function 
of the type of urban social structure. 
Indeed, under certain conditions, the regulation of the number of 
children in accordance with rational criteria, is more closely associated 
with middle class values and culture, while in other circumstances these 
tendencies penetrate the elite levels and faider down towards the lower 
classes. The net impact on the city's birth rate evidently depends on 
the percentage of the population in each stratum. Where such behaviour 
if found only in the middle class, the effect on the city's birth rate 
will not be significant given the former's reduced number. Growth 
1/ Paula Hollerbach Hass, op- clt-
2/ M. Helena Henrique v.. La mqyilldad social y la fecundidad en Rio de 
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FEMALE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY MARITAL STATUS 
(Percentages ) 





Ao Activity rates by marital status 
Bogotá 72oO 25.4 3̂ .3 é2ol 39.3 &/ 
Buenos Airea 70.2 25o7 21.1 67,6 35.5 2¿ 
Carasas 57.9 10.6 13.5 54c, 2 3I.8 a/ 
México 62.0 17.6 27.6 6lr,6 30,4 a/ 
Panamá 55»¿ 3l»5 24,4 59.6 37®9 n/ 
San JosS 6o»4 21.5 26.6 50.5 33.2 a/ 
Río do Janeiro 4?<>3 12.2 29.3 43.9 23.3 a/ 
B, Distribution of activity «men by marital status 
Bogotá 41.4 4,0 19«7 100.0 
Buono s Aìrt>3 3^0 55.7 0.5 ?..8 100.0 
Cayucas 29*2 34.4 6.,3 3 o a 100,0 
Mexico AW 37*7 7 . 2 21..4 100,0 
Panamá 25cl 34.3 17.I 23 c5 100,0 
San José 38.fi 39.1 5*9 16«4 100.0 
Rio da Jansii-o . 4c,5 3^*3 7e 1 18,1 100.0 
0. Distribution of inactive isimsn by multai sterni 
Bogotá 8.8 78,5 4.9 7 . 7 100,0 
Buenos Aires 8.0 88.3 1.1 2,6 100,0 
Caracas 9.0 59*1 19.1 11*9 100.0 
Mexico 9*0 77.0 8»2 5.8 100.0 
Panama 12.3 45.5 32,5 9,7 100.0 
San José 12.6 7-î.ul 8-2 Sol 100,0 
Rio de Janeiro 12.7 75.1 5.2 7.0 100.0 
D. Distribution of all women by marital status 
Bogotá ISM 64 «O 4„ 5 1204 100.0 
Buenos Aires l?o2 7608 0,9 5 a 100,0 
Caracas láeO 51o3 2.5 <»o 17*7 100,0 
Méxìoo 16.5 65 „0 7.9 10c6 100,0 
Panamá 17o2 41.2 26.7 14.9 100,0 
San Jos£ 21.3 60*5 7 ^ 10.8 100,0 
Rio de Janairo 19.2 65.5 5.7 9O6 100.0 
Source: CE'̂ ûE (PEGFAL-U), TsJiuia'òion group II_, valables I9 x 26. 
a/ Total activity rates vary from those of table 2 due to the different numb»' of respondents» 
/Table 10a 
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Table 10a ' 
AVERAGE NUMBER OP CHILDREN BCRiJ TO MARRIED WOMEN AND WOMEN LIVING IN CONSENSUAL 
ONION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS» MEXICO, BIENOS AIRES AND RIO DE JANEIRO 










Superior non manual workers 17.68 285 977 3.43 
Inferior non manual workers 27,1+2 442 1 608 3.74 
Manual workers 54.90 885 4 035 4.60 
Total 100c00 1 612 '6 620 4gl6 
Buenos Aires -
Superior non manual workers 9.56 151 268 1.91 
Inferior non manual workers 45« 4; 719 1 264 lo76 
Manual workers 44.97 711 1 332 1.91 
Total 100,00 lj§8l 2 8 64 ya 
Río cto Janeiro 
Supí'.'ior non manual workers 13« 20 228 532 2.33 
Inferior non manual workers 31c33 - 541 1 221 2,26 
Manual workers 55.47 958 3 030 3.0.16 
Total. 100^00 2J12 OM h3L 
Source j Maria Helena Henriquea? hi movilidad social y la fsr.undtcla/3 . en Rio de Janeiro, 
CELASE, Serie C, N°. 112, Santiago, Chile, 1968, P . 8 . 
/of the 
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of the middle classes would bring a larger reduction in the city's 
reproduction rate and a gradual dissemination of their'criteria 
amongst the élite and lower classes, resulting in a clear drop in average 
urban fertility. 
The few existing studies on social mobility and fertility complement 
these theories« Research shows that the educational success of low class 
students may be related to the smaller size of the original family, and that 
the groups experiencing ascending mobility are typified by smaller family 
nuclei, than the downwardly-mobile, while those which do not undergo 
1/ 
changes in status have larger families than the rest* 
(d)' Mass mobilization and the birth rate 
38- There exist various indications, the partial research results which 
suggest that political mobilization and organization could constitute a 
factor which would rationalise reproductive behaviour- While no 
conclusive evidence can be found, existing data are consistent with 
this theory«^ 
In the first place, it has been observed on various occasions that 
among the popular classes the members of Protestant groups, typified 
by a high level of organization and cohesion, have smaller families-
It has been noted that in the popular classes, fertility tends to drop 
first in the organized workers category. In both cases, while the 
variables involved would by themselves explain the lower reproduction rate? 
it would however be erroneous to ignore the role of conscientization in 
these sectors-
Recent research shows that in the marginal strata,fertility declines 
with community organisation and political mobilization» Studies oí" the 
1"' ~ •!' " 1 I1' 
1/ Ruth Sautú, research carried out on the basis of the university census 
of Buenos Aires, 1958, apd the Survey on stratification and social 
mobility in Greater Buenos Aires, carried out in 1960-1961 and 
published in the Research Bulletin of the Institute of Sociology 
of the University of Buenos Aires, 1963» 
2/ Duque and Pastrana, Las estrategias de supervivencia economica del 
sector popular urbanqT ELAS, FLACSQ, 1973} Ramiro Pavon Gonzales;, 




same age cohorts show that schooling and the participation of women 
in the labour force have different effects on reproductive behaviour 
depending, on the existence of the above-mentioned conditions. In an 
amorphous social group, employment and education of women are variables 
which go a long way to explain the differences in-fertility- However, 
where unstable educational levels and participation in employment 
exist, and where the social group is organized to attain goals5 it may 
be observed that the birth rate also tends to drop. 
39* Apparently, the mobilization of a marginal group to achieve 
specific aims, creates in individuals a level of consciousness which 
contributes to a better understanding of their situation in relation to 
the structure of society, and induces conduct tending to link individual 
destiny to specific action projects. Mobilization creates expectations of 
a better life, and forms aspirations to mobility in sectors which lack 
the attributes allowing them to participate in the market; it is a source 
of socialization which, through the understanding of the political 
opportunities offered to acquire concrete benefits from the authorities, 
aids the gradual assimilation of rational principles of action« It may 
also be assumed that the organization fesuiting from the initial 
mobilization completely redefines the situation of individuals and their 
families; by replacing the traditional solidarity based on primary 
relationships for survival in a hostile environment with the solidarity 
from the attainment of common goals through the power derived from 
greater cohesion, the idea that rational behaviour can redefine the 
destiny of the individual is reinforced. 
/IV, PUBLIC 
kX 
IV. PUBLIC ACTION W THE FJEW' OF POPULATION 
1. Considerations regarding population policies 
40. One of the peculiarities of the Latin American situation is the 
intervention of the State in population matters to a considerable extent 
in some countries and to a much lesser in others. This phenomenon is very-
likely due to the role which the State has played in the development 
process and to the long-standing tradition of public health and social 
medicine which is characteristic of most of the countries of the region. 
The intervention of the public sector in this respect has obeyed 
two sets of considerations. The first, of an abstract- nature,.are founded 
on the projection of a model of future society and on the outline of 
global development strategies wherein it is assumed that both the volume 
of the population and the demographic- growth rates will be of major relevance.. 
The second have to do with the health sad wallbeing of the families* • 
By and large, Latin American Governments have avoided explicit 
definitions of their population policies. Where specific proposals have 
been formulated with a view to modifying birth rates, they have taken a 
form which could be described as a demographic policy. The e:;plicitness 
and implementations of such targets has so far varied widely <? from mere 
general statements to the formulation of plans establishing time objectives 
and defining the methods for achieving them. The purely demographic 
dimension of such policies does not, however, cover the full extent of the 
public sector's involvement. Some countries have recognised the 
advisability of the State's refraining from formulating explicit demographic 
targets, but this does not imply the cessation of such specialised services 
as the community may require ami which may have a bearing on the birth rate. 
This neutrality of the public sector has not been the rule everywhere j 
in some cases, commitment? for the provision of services have been so 
far-reaching that they have in fact- constituted tacit demographic objectives? 
while elsewhere they have been geared strictly to direct social demands and 
irj other situations, to marginal considerations. 
/2, Social 
tn /f2 m 
2. Social consensus and the justification of State intervention 
41. A summary review of the situation indicates that; in formulating 
policies whose main purpose has been to alter the birth rate, a fundamental 
role has been played by interpretations of the nature of the development 
process and of the destiny of the country as a social project and by the 
leanings of religious groups and institutions exercising an influence on 
the definition of the community's moral values. • 
Such interpretations have served as a, basis for the formulation of 
these policies whereirer a genuine consensus has existed* This, however, 
has been the exception rather than the rule. Where no consensus has 
evolved , the conflicting interpretations have prevented the achievement 
of these objectiveŝ  A.power of veto has likewise been wielded by 
religious groups. 
The State's commitment to provide mere services requi.vef-s, in practice, 
a much lesser degree of consensus. Programmes have been organised in order 
to meet concrete health requirements and have spread thanks to the support 
of the social sectors and professional groups most directly concerned, 
The relative neutrality of the State in terms of the establishment of 
demographic targets has partly reflected the dissuasive capacity of 
dissident sectors of opinion; moreover, the existence of programmes that 
commit the public sector often signifies broad acceptance of a set of 
indispensable measures which even its opponent^ are prepared to tolerate, 
42. The justification for such policies varies according to whether or 
not the State holds a neutral position xfith regards to the decisions of 
the families. Efforts directed to alteration of the reproduction rate 
derive from economic considerations concerning the rate and nature of 
development, from concepts of land settlement and territorial integration 
and from geo-political visions of power and international influence. 
On the other hand, when a policy of neutrality is adopted and the 
public sector's influence is exerted indirectly through specific programmes, 
the main factors are the wellbeing of the family nucleus and, possibly, 
the tacit awareness that the possibility of intervention is de facto 
restricted by the imbalances inherent in semi-development and by the 
/existence of 
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existence of backward social sectors.; consequently, these activities have 
to be designed in terms of social policy and not as part of an economic 
development strategy. 
The concept of family wellbeing has frequently been linked to the 
idea that every woman has a right to decide freely how many children she 
wants to bear, and that the provision of the indispensable services and 
access to information should form part of the ̂ distributive policy in the 
field of education and culture, thereby modifying the kind of situation 
where certain sectors are in a. position to decide upon the sis® of their 
families while, for the vast masses, fate /is the deciding factor. 
3» The state of population policies 
43. The public sector'? ventures into the realm of population have not 
always culminated in the definition of concrete proposals. In countries 
like Argentina and Uruguay, the occasional interest shown by people in the 
public eye in a higher demographic growth rate, while not amounting to a 
policy in the strictest sense, does point to a desire among certain 
important sectors of public opinion that the State should intervene. This 
also would appear to have been the situation in the recent past in Ecuador. 
In Venezuela, and until little more than a year ago, in Mexico, the 
State had shown some hesitation about becoming directly involved in 
attempts to modify the birth rate. 
In Honduras, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, demographic 
policies have been formulated with a view to reducing population grpwth, 
to the extent of defining birth rate? and time horizons, 
Generally speaking, the following represents the situation as to the 
definition of public population objectives in so far as they can be 
distinguished at the present times 
(a) Governments in favour of faster population growth but which have 
not yet translated their intentions into policies (Argentina and Uruguay)j 
(b) Governments which consider that present rates and current trends 
are acceptable and that the public sector should avoid defining demographic 
targets (Brazil an4 possibly Peru)? 
/Table H 
TU4« 11 
DEJiCGRAFHIC POLICIES AND FAMILY Pi4f®?IN5 SERVJCSS IN T & T Y UfIN AJSUCAN COUNTRIES 
The Governments 
Policy . provides family planning services in the forw of? 
national of npovtelj luoal 







Have a demographic policy! 
(a) In favour of rapid population growth 
(b) Opposed to rapid population gjwfch Honduras 
Poroinioan Eepubllo 
El Salvador 
(c) Which accepts existing rates and trends Brazil 
Peru 
Have no demographic policy» 




















v 45 " 
(c) Governments which manifest an intent-ion to intervene through 
nation-wide programmes which would ultimately have repercussions on the 
birth rate yet, refrain from establishing demographic targets (Colombia, 
Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama)? 
(d) Governments which intervene by means of special programmes of 
local or limited scope (Venezuela and Paraguay)? 
(e) Governments which have defined targets for lower birth rates 
(El Salvador, Honduras and the Dominican Republic). 
4. Public sector programmes 
44. While Governments'have expressed intentions and initiated policies 
that have varyingly supported or opposed family planning programmes, the 
public sector has in fact expanded its activities in this area. 
Over the past decade, public health planners and experts in the region 
have recognized that there are unsatisfied needs in the fielt* ef mother and 
child health, and that there seem to be clear indications in urban areas of 
growing demand for family planning information and services. 
This recognition has led to a rapid expansion of public and semi-public 
programmes of varying nature and scope which, as a general rule, tend to 
improve mother and child health and, within this context, provide information 
and medical services that have an influence on family planning. For example, 
in some government departments, specialized administrative units have been 
set up, action programmes and staff training programmes have been initiated 
and there has been a rapid increase in medical and social research, together 
with investment ih installations and facilities. Given their preocupation 
with the unit cost of medical care in a situation of meagre resources and 
given the disproportionate segment of the total budget spertt on 
maternal-child care, it ip not surprising that doctors and health 
administrators have formed the group that has pressed most forcefully for 
the establishment of such programmes. Frequently, such initiatives have 
met with success although opinion has lpeen against them and the survival of 
programmes has depended on their ability to limit activities to public 
health issues. While at another level, arguments still rage over the role 
of population increase in development, growing awareness i?f the health 
/problem? of 
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problems of the lower strata and the need to improve th# allocation pf 
scarce resources assigned to the health sector, has resulted in public 
administration's becoming the sponsor of these initiatives and undertaking 
their expansion according to demands and needs. 
5. Origin of activities 
45, As a general rule, family planning activities have been initiated 
by private associations, it has been found that such programmes,, often 
not recognized by the competent authorities, reached significant levels 
after their initial phase. The duration of this phase would seem to have 
been determined by the relationship between the level pf concern for the 
social and medical problems in the community and the level pf cultural 
and religious opposition. 
A rapid examination of the development pf these programmes shows 
that the later they were initiated the shorter their phase (See 
table 12), Everything indicates that there has been a change in the 
general situation, in the sense that opposition has been less radical̂  
This may well have coincided with increases in school attendance, the 
growth of urbanization, the growing secularization of values, the increase 
in the number of live births per woman of child-bearing age observable 
from 1950 onwards, and the expansion of medical services, ail of which 
have led to greater awareness of the health problems, of the lower strata, 
46. The private phase was followed in most cases by a stage in which 
the State topic over control of activities. The work of private 
associations was then linked to the activities of the public sector in 
three ways: 
(a) In many countries, private associations initiated their activities 
in collaboration with clinics and public hospital?. Subsequently, the 
public institutions became interested in expanding and rationalizing 
services. 
(b) in other case?, the work of the associations paved the way fpr 
State intervention, 
(c) There have been countries in which the St̂ te has deliberately 
avoided intervention, although ha? permitted the gradual, strengthening 
of such activities and growing use of public facilities. 
/Table 12 

It i s also noteworthy that public sector act iv i t ies reached significant 
levels a f te r a period of gestation or consolidation of programmes during 
whiqh objectives were established and other problems such as administrative 
location, financing and methods Of operation were resolved. J t i ? evident 
that the specific evolution of programmes ha? depended on a number of 
factor?, including the importance of these in i t ia t ives during the private 
phase, the social and cultural opposition encountered, and the ab i l i t y tp 
device programmes pf health administration. It is interesting that the 
longer i t took to in i t ia te such ac t iv i t i es , the less time was needed to 
consolidate the programme^ (See table 13)» 
6. Present stage of the programmes 
47* I t is d i f f i c u l t to asses? the scope of such public sector ac t i v i t i e s , 
The majority of them are recent, and the available data, are part ial or 
incomplete and nearly three years dated, Differences in the national 
situations are quite evident, however, and recent developments have 
probably not greatly altered the general picture which existed up to 1969? 
I t can be observed that a c r i t i c a l factor in most cases i s the 
provision of adequate infrastructure of services, $n eight countries 
which represent oyer $9 per cent of the po puliation of the region, there i s an 
average of one family planning cl inic for eyery 200,000 women of childbearing 
age, with the lowest rat io in this group qf countries being I to 35,000. 
In four countries the rat io was between 10,000 and 20,000, while only f i v e 
countries had less than 10,000 women of chiidbearing ages per clinic« 
Neither do the results of the programmes seem satisfactory? in 13 
countries less than z per cent of the women were protected, and only in 
two was the proportion above 10 per cent. 
On the basis of a very preliminary review of these data, three 
situations may be distinguished? f i r s t , countries which in fact have no 
infrastructure of services; second, those which are in the process of 
expanding such services, and lastly,those which already have satisfactory 
f a c i l i t i e s . 
/Table 13 
Table 13 
BATES OB* INITIATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF FAMILY PLAHNU» ACTIVITIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 














Trinidad and Tobago 
Venezuela . 























In countries with a high birth rate, the lack of infrastructure may 
result from policies (or rather, demographic principles), which are opposed 
to State intervention, or from absence of an adequate system of medical 
services. 
Where the infrastructure is insufficient and is in process of being 
expanded, the critical factors would seem to be that the programmes had 
only recently been consolidated, and that the system of health institutions 
was still very inadequate. In turn, countries which already have 
adequate services, either started much earlier and/or possess a better 
developed public health system, or else they are small countries with a 
low level of urbanization but with a rural population concentrated in some 
densely populated areas. 
The results of the programmes in countries which have adequate -
facilities seem in their turn to depend on the general aisga of development 
and modernization. 
/Table 14 
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Tabi® 
COUNTRIES CLASSIFIED BT NUMBER OF WOMEN OF CHIUBSARItëî AGE m FAMILY PÎAHNIN& 
OUKIO, AND PERCENTAGE OF PROTECTED TOMEN OF CHILDBEAñli» 
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48- The foregoing chapters show how current interest in Latin America 
in population problems is determined by factors and circumstances that 
arise from the level of economic growth and from the process of social 
modernization. These factors and circumstances have gradually found 
their expression in a revision of the development system and of its 
objectives, in profound modifications in the conduct and values of the 
population and in new solutions and institutional attitudes. Given the 
disequilibrium and ambivalence that exist in a state of semi-development, 
the subject has lost its apparent specificity and has instead become 
bound up with the concepts and ideologies of social change and has come 
to constitute, in its own right, one of the fundamental variablea in 
the outlines and projects of society that are currently being debated. 
It is therefore understandable that, when viewing the question of 
population within the context of present-day diagnoses and thrives of 
development, the region should place so much emphasis on spa-eding up 
the process and clarifying its objectives. Many of the dilemas which arise 
in discussing the role of population in development (and thei.e are complicated 
even further by the introduction of immediate political considers lions) 
are in fact dilemnas borrowed from the definition of the social and 
political objectives that determine economic growth. All this stems 
from a recognition of the crisis of conventional models of social 
coe>d.i'.tenc3 and economic transformation and a desire to explore new 
avenues of social integration and institutional rationalization to 
overcome the social and political barriers that the economic process have 
encountered at this particular stage of semi-development. 
Semi-development in the region has likewise brought major changes 
in population behaviour, particularly in urban centres. This is an obvious 
result of progress. What began as a barely perceptible adjustment is 
rapidly becoming the affirmation of new values and models of life. 
In a little over half a century, a secular culture has evolved that is 
run more and more along acquisitive lines. 
The imbalances and lack of continuity that are characteristic of 
semi-development give rise to a peculiar demographic situation in vihich 
/the growth 
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the growth rate of the population increases. Progress, though evident, 
is limited and is selective in the way it affects classes, sectors 
and groups of society. . 
k9- The secularization;of behaviour is reflected in three parallel 
but asynchronous processes that define the nature of the system of 
modernization: 
(i) the intensification of market relationships and, concomitantly, 
the incorporation of new sectors of the population? 
(ii) the diffusion and intensification of experiments in social 
mobility; -
(iii) the expansion of the citizenry by means of political 
mobilization and the appearance of basic organizations. 
Available information is indicative of the role that these 
processes play in the secularization of reproductive behaviour and of the 
selective way in which it evolves. In a stage of semi-development, 
its overall impact is necessarily slow and gradual, although the 
apparent stabilization of the rate of reproduction conceals underlying 
dynamic situations. The clearest symptoms of this trend are undoubtedly 
the redefinition of the role"of •Women in society and the readjustment 
of family relationships in line with a more competitive, unstable and 
fluid urban context. 
Further proof that a definite evolution is taking place, 
ie the fact that, contrary to what happened in the. 
industrialized countries in the past, population problems in Latin 
America have become a matter for action by the public sector- This 
raises the question of the definition of alternative development 
styles and the existence of social requirements and demands- State 
action has often taken place without there being any real consensus 
simply because the state has had to face the painful realities of 
human reproduction among the urban lower classes. 
/50. The 
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50. The foregoing all goes to show that the incorporation of the 
population variable in development policies must reflect the variety 
of situations that exists in Latin American countries and that the use of 
birth control as an alternative to development in any case implies 
neglect of the social forces that generate changes in reproductive 
behaviour. 
It is also obvious that interpretations of population problems have 
evolved at two fairly isolated levels: at one level, the macro-interpretations 
which, generally speaking, do not consider social requirements and demands 
and, at the other, a more pragmatic attempt to solve specific problems 
of health and wellbeing directly. Population policies must be capable 
of integrating both approaches. 
